บทความทางว ชาการ เร องท 2

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1 บทความทางว ชาการ เร องท 2 ASIAN ROLES IN MANAGING THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE โดย นายเมธา จ นทร ช น ผ พ พากษาศาลจ งหว ดฝาง

2 ASIAN ROLES IN MANAGING THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE I INTRODUCTION There have been many extremely complicated disputes regarding sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. 1 China, Taiwan, 2 Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are claimants for which the whole, or some part of the small islets of the Spratly Islands, including surroundings water areas, are asserted. 3 Indeed, further armed conflict could flare up by the dispute over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands as it is a valuable source of rich oil and gas in a strategic location, and the inefficient mechanism and framework of international law, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) 4, to resolve the Spratly Islands disputes. 5 The provision of UNCLOS regarding the dispute settlement is applicable to the Spratly Islands dispute in order to reach a peaceful resolution. 6 As all claimants are signatories to UN- CLOS, the dispute mechanism provided in UNCLOS could be utilised. 7 Currently, an international arbitration process, under UNCLOS, has been initiated by the Philippines and Vietnam regarding the Spratly Islands dispute. 1 Junwu Pan, Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China s Territorial and Boundary Dispute(MartinusNijhoff, 2009), Both the People s Republic of China and Taiwan regard themselves as the representative government of China to claim the Spratly. In other word, the claims of the PRC and Taiwan to the Spratlys are on the ground of one China policy. Thus in this essay, Taiwan s claim shall not be treated separately. 3 Pan, above n 1. 4 United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).( UNCLOS ) 5 L.G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 61, David Whiting, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea (1997) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 897, Whiting above n 6. 1

3 In addition, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) 8 has attempted to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute through its mechanisms. Although ASEAN has failed to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute for several decades because of its weaknesses, and some critics believe that the arbitration itself would resolve the Spratly islands disputes, the author would argue that arbitration alone, may not resolve the dispute, as it would also require ASEAN in order to reach a resolution. This essay summarises the background of the SpratlyIslands dispute and the claims of all claimants; the dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS, including the attempt of the- Philipines; and Vietnam in the arbitration process. Finally, it will describe the role of ASEAN in the Spratly Islands dispute. II BACKGROUND There are over 230 islands and atolls in the Spratly, or Nansha,Islands, which stretches over 500 nautical miles from north to south. 9 It is located in the South China Sea; about 900 nautical miles from the south of the Hainan island of China; about 230 nautical miles from the east of Vietnam; about 120 nautical miles from the Palawan of Philippines; and about 150 nautical miles from the Sabah of Malaysia. 10 There are small numbers of features considered as islands and many of these islands are not able to sustain human habitation or economic life 8 ASEAN is the only regional organisation in Southeast Asia which 10 official members; Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos PDR, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippine, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. 9 Pooja Theresa Stanslas, The Spratly Dilemma: External Powers and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, (2010) Fundacja Aleksandra Kwasneiwskiego, Stanslas, above n 9.. 2

4 of their own as provided in art 121 of UNCLOS. 11 As a result, these islands are likely to be categorisedas rocks and only entitled to twelve nautical miles territorial sea. 12 However, a few of the islands, which may be able to sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, can be classified as islands and therefore could be entitled to a two hundred nautical miles exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) and a continental shelf of their own. 13 The Spratly Islands dispute is furtherintensified by the emergence of high technology drilling, and the increasing interest in searching for petroleum resources around the islands, and the adjacent continental shelf. 14 In addition, the Spratly Islands dispute isintensified because of the strategic location as vital regional sea lanes. 15 The Spratly Islands sit astride major sea lanes related to the Indian Ocean, East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. 16 Adverse effects on maritime trade and military transport could occur as a result of escalating tension. 17 Interestingly, some major countries including the US, Japan, Australia and India, remain concerned about complete access to all travel routes, including safe passage through sea lanes and flight paths. 18 III CLAIMS TO THE SPRATLYSISLANDS Sovereignty over all features of the Spratly Islands isclaimed by China and Vietnam. 19 Sovereignty over fifty-three of the features, known as the Kalayaan Island Group, are claimed 11 Robert C Beckman and Leonardo Bernard, Disputes in the South China Sea: International Legal Aspects, The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Securtiy and Developemnet, Beckman and Bernard, above n Ibid. 14 Stanslas, above n 9, Ibid Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Beckman and Bernard, above n 11. 3

5 by the Philippines and eleven features are claimed by Malaysia. 20 Two features, Louisa Bank and Rifleman Bank, are claimed by Brunei as part of its continental shelf. 21 A Chinese Claims Sovereignty over the entire group of features is claimed by China, whilst the recognition of other nations,claims has been refused. 22 Historical evidence is based on the Chinese claims. 23 A number of historical events, and the navigation to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD, and the Ming Dynasty between 1403 and 1433 AD, are grounds for China s claim. 24 In addition, China also uses archaeological evidence, of Chinese fishermen and merchants working over the region, to strengthen their claims. 25 Claims to the Spratly Islands were declared by China in 19 th century. 26 However, the Spratly Islands were later claimed by Japan during World War II. In 1947, a nine undefined dot lines map, which the Spratly Islands are within those lines, was produced by China and they claimed all of the islands located within those lines, including the Spratly Islands. 27 In 1992, China declared The Law of the People s of Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, in which the whole Nansha (Spratly islands) is specifically identified in art Ibid Ibid. 22 Michael Bennett, The People s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, (1992) 28 Stanford Journal of International Law, Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Cordner, above n 5. 4

6 B Vietnamese Claims Sovereignty over all the Spratly Islands is claimed by Vietnam on the grounds of historical events before, during and after French occupation. 29 In the 1930s, the Spratly Islands were claimed by France and on behalf of its thencolony, Vietnam. 30 The entire Spratly Islands are claimed by Vietnam as an offshore district of the province of KhanhHoa. 31 An extensive area of the South China Sea is also claimed by Vietnam, although Vietnam lodged an obscure claim. 32 Archaeological evidence is used by Vietnam, similar to China, to strengthen sovereignty claims. 33 C Filipino Claims Approximately sixty features in the Spratly Islands are claimed by the Philippines on the grounds of discovery and proximity. 34 The Philippines claims that Tomas Cloma, who was a Filipino businessman and lawyer, discovered several islands in 1956, thus such a discovery is asserted to be terra nullius. 35 In 1971, eight islands were officially claimed as part of the Kalayaan based upon Cloma s exploration and the Philippines argued that such islands were not part of the entire Spratly islands and no other countries could claim ownership. 36 In 1972, the Philippines designated those islands as part of Palawan Province of Kalayaan municipali- 29 Ibid Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Pan, above n 1, Ibid. 36 Ibid. 5

7 ty. 37 In 1978, the Kalayaan Island was decreed, by President Ferdinand Marcos, as part of the Philippines sovereign territory. 38 D Malaysian Claims The southern part of the Spratly Islands is claimed by Malaysia. 39 Geography proximity are the grounds for their claims, and the provisions of UNCLOS on the continental shelf are used as justification, which coincides with the continental shelf area defined in the 1979 Map of Malaysia. 40 All the islands and atolls on the shelf are shown on the map as Malaysian jurisdiction based on UNCLOS. 41 In 1984, an Exclusive Economic Zone Act was proclaimed by Malaysia, which indicated that the southern part of the Spratly Islands shall be extended to their jurisdiction. 42 In 1996, a Continental Shelf Act was promulgated by Malaysia which is similar to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 43 Article 121 (1) of UN- CLOS is also used by Malaysia to support their claim. 44 E Bruneian Claims Louisa Reef, located in the south of the Spratly Islands, is claimed by Brunei and only Malaysia counter-claims this. 45 The delimitation of its continental, established by Britain in 1954,isgrounds for their claim. 46 In 1988, a continental shelf, based upon a 350 nautical mile continental shelf interpretation, was extended beyond the Rifleman Bank by a Brunei map Ibid. 38 Cordner, above n 5, Ibid Ibid. 41 Pan, above n 1, Ibid. 43 Cordner, above n 5, Pan, above n 1, Cordner, above n 5, Ibid. 47 Pan, above n 1,

8 In 1993, the Declaration on the Exclusive Economic Zone was issued by Brunei which establishes an EEZ, which covers the Louisa Reef located in the south of the Spratly. 48 IV DISPUTERESOLUTION UNDER UNCLOS All claimants in the Spratly Islands are signatories to UNCLOS providing a legal framework for all activities in any ocean. 49 However, UNCLOS does not provide any provisions to decide the conflicting sovereignty claims over the features. 50 UNCLOS assumes that sovereignty over land territory, and the features, are already known. 51 Finally, the maritime zones, which can be decided from such territories and features, are set out. 52 Under art 287 of UNCLOS, one or more of the four procedures can be freely chosen by a State for the dispute settlement regarding the interpretation or application on the UNClOS. 53 There are four alternatives for a State or Nation; adjudication before the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ); adjudication before the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea ( ITLOS ); arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS; or special arbitration under Annex VII of UN- CLOS. 54 However, the ICJ and ITLOS have not been recognised as a compulsory jurisdiction by China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, as they have not submitted the declarations recognising such jurisdiction, while the reservation for compulsory jurisdiction was made by Philip- 48 Ibid. 49 Beckman and Bernard, above n 11, Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid Ibid. 7

9 pines indicating their territorial disputes shall not to be applied by those jurisdictions. 55 Therefore, if those claimants would choose the ICJ and the ITLOS for settlement, a special agreement regarding the recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ and ITLOS would be required. 56 A. Arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS There is no nation which claims sovereignty over features in the Spratly Islands that have made a selection under art 287 of UNCLOS. 57 Therefore, when the claimant invokes the compulsory binding dispute settlement system regarding the Spratly Islands dispute, such a dispute would be automatically forwarded to arbitration under VII of UNCLOS Philippine Arbitration On 22 January 2013, the Philippines chose to move their Spratly Islands dispute with China to the compulsory dispute settlement of UNCLOS, by initiating an international arbitration. 59 The dispute regarding the sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and the maritime resources around them,isthe main concern. 60 The proceedings has been refused to participate by China but the president of ITLOS appointed an arbitral tribunal anyway. 61 On 7 De- 55 Pan, above n 1, Ibid. 57 Beckman and Bernard, above n 11, Ibid; UNCLOS art 287(5). 59 Peter A. Dutton, The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and the South China Sea, (15 March 2013) Centre for a New American Security, 2 < merow_0.pdf>. 60 Dutton, above n 59, China Daily Mail, China rejects arbitration with Philippines in South China Sea dispute, (9 December 2014) < 8

10 cember 2014, a position paper was published on China s foreign ministry website which, for all intents and purpose, is an argument on an arbitral tribunal jurisdiction. 62 The Permanent Court of Arbitration was asked to determine whether China s nine-dashed line, which claims sovereignty over the entire South China Sea s water, is contrary to UN- CLOS, and thus invalid. 63 The Philippines asserts that only international law, as represented byunclos is the basis of a legitimate maritime boundary. 64 While the policy regarding the meaning of the nine-dashed line has not been publicly stated, a picture of the nine-dashed line was officially submitted to the United Nations in order to oppose a continental shelf right based on UNCLOS as defined in a joint claimby Vietnam and Malaysia. 65 China claims that a broader maritime right in the South China Sea than UNCLOS s authorisation is allowed to assert to its sovereignty over the South China Sea, and thus, their claims are legitimate as a result of UNCLOS, plus other factors such as history. 66 In addition,the Philippines claims thatchina occupied certain small, uninhabitable coralprojections that are barely above water at high tide, and which are rocks under UNCLOS. 67 Moreover, the Philippines claim is that China occupied and built structures on certain submerged [features] that do not qualify as islands under UNCLOS, but are parts of the Philippines continental shelf. 68 This asserts that that there is no legal right to the continental shelf, which is far from China s coast lines, belongs to China Ibid. 63 Dutton, above n 59, Ibid Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid Ibid. 9

11 Finally, the Philippines assert that China interfered with the exercise by the Philippines of its rights. 70 More specifically, the Scarborough Reef, where most of the area is submerged, except from a few rocks are above water at high tide, which China could technically claim sovereign territory, is primarily requested as part of the claim Vietnam Arbitration On 11 December 2014, Vietnam decided to join with the Philippines by making a submission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration that they assert the court's jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands and the ParacelIslands, and requested the Permanent Court of Arbitration to give due regard to their rights and interests in the Spratly Islands and ParacelIslands, including their EEZ and continental shelf, and declared that there was no legal basis on China s nine-dash line. 72 Their submission was a response to a position paper which China published on7 December 2014, laying down their grounds, although China had not made a formalsubmission to the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning the Philippine s request. 73 Three main claims opposing China s grounds on the Spratly Islands incorporated in a statement was sent by Vietnam to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. 74 Firstly, the jurisdiction of the court over the case concerning the Philippines request wasrecognisedby Vietnam, which is a direct contradiction to the position of China, who thought the court had no jurisdiction. 75 Secondly, Vietnam asked the Arbitral Panel to give "due regard" to the legal rights and 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 China Daily Mail, above n Ibid. 74 South China Morning Post, Beijing rejects Hanoi's legal challenge on Spratly, Paracel islands disputes (12 December 2014) < 75 Ibid. 10

12 interests of Vietnam in the SpratlysIslands, the ParacelIslands, EEZ, and the continental shelf of Vietnam, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration decides on the matter of the Philippine case. Finally, Vietnam rejected the nine-dash line demarcation of China which is the basis that China claims sovereignty over the South China Sea; as such nine-dashed line was without legal basis. 76 Although some critiques argue that there is not any procedure in the UNCLOS dispute settlement system for third-part interventions, Vietnam might file their own legal claim and form their own arbitral tribunal after the Permanent Court of Arbitration issues an award in favour of the Philippines. B. Is Permanent Court ofarbitration a Resolution A refrain from participation is an option for China with the hope for a favourable award. 77 In addition, the decision to engage in negotiations with Vietnam and the Philippines, in order to withdraw the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration issues an award, is another option for China. As China is a member of the UNCLOS, but their claims regarding nine-dashed lines are not consistent with the provisions under UNCLOS, it is likely that the Permanent Court ofarbitral s award might be in favour of the Philippines and Vietnam, other than China. The declaration that the arbitration process is null and void, and the results are ignored could, be enacted by China if they lose the case. 78 However, as a result of China losing the case, their neighbours must keep in mind China s unwillingness to play the game and be party to 76 Ibid. 77 Dutton, above n 59, Ibid. 11

13 further negotiations. 79 In response, the ways to bolster an award as a rules-based order may be seen by other countries in the region and beyond, as a way to provide an equal weight for all claimants against China. 80 In order to avoid such a response, China would have to seek negotiations with the Philippines and Vietnam, both before and after, the final arbitration s award. V ASIANROLE IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE ASEAN sought to pursue a proactive role in response to intensified dispute developments in the South China Sea and ASEAN has done so through its statement relating to developments in the area, its dialogue with China, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 81 The most important statement is the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea issued in This declaration, at which China attended the meeting, and signed, refers to the association s core principles, and urges all parties concerned to resolve sovereignty and jurisdictional issues over the dispute via peaceful means, and without the resort to force. 83 Within the dispute management framework, the Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia ( TAC ), which was adopted by all concerned claimants in July 2001, is a potential mechanism to settle disputes in the South 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 RamesAmer, The South China Sea: Challenge for Asean, (31 March 2014) Policy Brief Institute for Security and Development Policy, 1 < 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 12

14 China Sea. 84 The TAC not only reiterates the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibition of the threat or use of force but also provides a framework for dispute settlement 85 including the Spratly dispute. In 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ( DOC ). 86 In 2011, ASEAN and China adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC with the aim to reduce tensions and strengthen the peaceful management of the dispute as well as respect the status quo. 87 However, over recent years tension has intensified with China over their alleged repeatedly breaching the terms of the DOC. 88 Discussions within ASEAN, as well as between ASEAN and China regarding a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ( COC ), is still in progress as a further positive step. 89 A Strengths and Weaknesses of ASEAN to Resolve the Spratly Islands Dispute 1. Strengths One of the strengths in resolving the Spratly Islands dispute is that the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei who are claimants, are members of ASEAN. Therefore, the negotiation process under the ASEAN mechanism, in order to reach a multilateral agreement, could most probably be attained. Another strength is the full attempts of ASEAN to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute as result of the considerable concern in the region. These attempts can be evidenced from all progress in order to manage tensions which directly affect to ASEAN, if the tension from the Spratly Islands dispute increases. 84 Ibid. 85 Pan, above n 1, Amer, above n Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen and Gegory B. Poling (eds), Perspectives on the South China Sea, Center for Strategic and Internation and Studies, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), Amer, above n 81, Ibid. 13

15 2. Weaknesses ASEAN needs to hasten the COC process with China to utilise it as an effective tool to maintain peace in the Spratly Islands. 90 However, China has tried to delay, and obstruct the formation of COC as China insists on a bilateral agreement. As ASEAN and China agreed to moveforward on the basis of consensus, it is difficult for ASEAN to speed up consultations on the COC if China is unwilling. In addition, there are the variety of views and interests of ASEAN members states. Not only the views and interests of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, who are four claimants of the Spratly Islands, but also Indonesia, the claimant over maritime zones to the north and northeast of the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. 91 Moreover, views and interests of other five member states, Thailand, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos PDR and Cambodia, with no claims in the Spratly Islands that have to be taken into consideration. The difficulty faced by ASEAN is a collection of states trying to find out a common approach. Another weakness is the mistrust between ASEAN members. For instance, ASEAN and China are parties to the TAC. Thus, it is possible that ASEAN member states and China may bring the Spratly dispute to the High Council. 92 However, up until now no member states of ASEAN have brought any other disputes to the High Council. 93 This indicates that mistrust still persists between ASEAN member states. 90 Ibid. 91 Hiebert, Nguyen and Poling, above n 87, Ibid Amer, above n 81,2. 14

16 Moreover, there is a variety of the perception of ASEAN member states toward China s policies and actions. 94 ASEAN member states differ in, not just the importance attached to the Spratly Islands dispute, but also their relationships with China and the kinds of regional responses prioritised. 95 Such differences challenge any collective position from ASEAN member states. Finally, China has had long concerns about ASEAN s relationship with the United States and ASEAN States intention toward China. 96 In order to avoid a US influence, China insists on a bilateral resolution. B Recommendation for ASEAN to Resolve the Spratly Islands Disputes Although ASEAN has several weakness as described above, the author believes that the main reason for failure to resolve the Spratly dispute is that China themselves lack of commitment to enter into multilateral agreement. However, all attempts that ASEAN has done continuously for several decades are not ineffective if the Permanent Court of Arbitration issues an award in favour of either the Philippines or Vietnam. As a result of such a favourable award, not only the Philippines and Vietnam, but also Malaysia and Brunei would take benefits from such an award. The author believes that such an award would bring China back to negotiate with ASEAN in order to enter into a multilateral agreement. Moreover, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has published its position paper raising the grounds that the dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Permanent 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Hiebert, Nguyen and Poling, above n 87,

17 Court of Arbitration and claimed that China, the Philippines and Vietnam have agreed through the DOC of ASEAN to settle their relevant disputes through negotiation. 97 This can imply that China acknowledges the importance of ASEAN in the Spratly Islands dispute and China would allow ASEAN to proceed with a multilateral agreement when deemedto be appropriate. The author also believes that to some extent, such an award would change China s position in deciding to engage in negotiations with the Philippines,Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, and ASEAN would be the best choice for China in order to reach a multilateral agreement. As a result, ASEAN would achieve its aim to reach a multilateral agreement with China after several decades of failed attempts. VI CONCLUSION As briefly stated, ASEAN has attempted to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute for severaldecades; however, it was not successful as China was not willing to do so. Consequently, the Philippines and Vietnam decided to initiate the arbitration under the provisions of UN- CLOS. In fact, although the Philippines and Vietnam initiated an arbitration process with the hope that the Permanent Court of Arbitration would resolve the Spratly Islands dispute with their favourableaward, such an award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration alone, might not be a resolution as China may declare the process null and void and ignore its results. However, to some extent such a favourable award might be meaningful for China, who persists on a bilateral agreement, but have to enter into multilateral agreement because, not only the Philippines and Vietnam, but also Malaysia and Brunei may benefit from the Permanent Court of Arbitration s award. At this point, ASEAN might be the best choice for China in order to not be bound by such an award but to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute by multilateral agree- 97 South China Morning Post, above n

18 ment. Therefore, ASEAN should continue to agree with China on the COC as it is a further positive step in its plan. When China has no choice but to make negotiations with those four countries, because of the Permanent Court of Arbitration s award in the Philippines and Vietnam cases, all would respect the efficiency of ASEAN as a mechanism to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute which is deemed to be one of the most complicated conflicts in the region. BIBLIOGRAPHY AArticles/Books/Reports Beckman, Robert C, and Bernard, Leonardo, Disputes in the South China Sea: International Legal Aspects, The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Securtiy and Developemnet, 4 Bennett, Michael The People s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, (1992) 28 Stanford Journal of International Law, 434 Cordner, L.G., The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 61, 64 Murray Hiebert, Nguyen, Phuong andgegory B. Poling (eds), Perspectives on the South China Sea, Center for Strategic and Internation and Studies, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 1 Pan, Jenwu, Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China s Territorial and Boundary Dispute(MartinusNijhoff, 2009), 163 Stanslas, PoojaTheresa, The Spratly Dilemma: External Powers and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, (2010) Fundacja Aleksandra Kwasneiwskiego, 2 Whiting, David, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea (1997) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 897, 903 BCases 17

19 C Legislation D Treaties United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).( UNCLOS ) E Others China Daily Mail, China rejects arbitration with Philippines in South China Sea dispute, (9 December 2014) < Dutton, Peter A., The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and the South China Sea, (15 March 2013) Centre for a New American Security, 2 < merow_0.pdf> RamesAmer, The South China Sea: Challenge for Asean, (31 March 2014) Policy Brief Institute for Security and Development Policy, 1 < South China Morning Post, Beijing rejects Hanoi's legal challenge on Spratly, Paracel islands disputes (12 December 2014) < 18